Thursday, 23 May 2013

Time, Space and the History of Mentalities







Mentalities as History
The history of mentalities confronts various concepts and experiences of time because it assumes that mentalities have a plural history and this multiple narrative of history—its texts and counter-texts, anti-texts and untexts—is experienced and recorded by human beings in various cultural conditions in different periods and places.  The two tendencies to stress the ontological development of each person as an individual, a member of a collective, and a part of the species homo sapiens and to focus on the discursive matrices of different kinds of collectivities also means that time—the word and the concept—must reveal within itself a vast and dynamic field of inquiry.
To begin, however, at the beginning, I see the history of mentalities as being the history of the relationship between things which are speakable and unspeakable, imaginable and unimaginable, and conceivable and inconceivable.  In other words, as a discipline it seeks to examine the tension between conscious and unconscious ideas, feelings, perceptions and social pressures and constraints.  While there is certainly a clear distinction to be made between those experiences which register in conventional, socially-acceptable words, images and institutions and those which lie outside of normal individual and collective awareness, there are also many places and times of overlap.  In regard to history of long duration, when transformations—with the fading out of older experiences and ideas and the shading in of newer perceptions and concepts—occur so slowly as to be outside of normal discourses and modes of artistic representation, we can work inwards from either end of the spectrum, at least from those points where radically different words, images, patterns and norms are operative towards those fuzzier periods when two or more competing systems seem to be in dialogue and debate, even if without full articulation; and we may be able to pinpoint some probable moments when the old paradigm gives way to the new, though usually such radical points where one critical mass is transferred to another remain beyond our abilities to reach, if they exist at all.  In regard to micro-historical events, such as those involving such small numbers of individuals or events of such limited influence that they exist under any statistical scrutiny or comparative documentary verification, we nevertheless can engage with them as evidence of variability and even reversibility within human nature.  As in quantum physics, the very long and slow duration of millennia (eons) and the very swift fluttering of a moment often operate by different laws than ordinary time in the space allotted to it: memories precede actions and feelings, while consequence determines cause and transforms the development of ordinary consciousness.
Time therefore has to be considered as more than a matter of existential continuance or of intensity of experience that registers in written or archaeological records.  Periodization by external markers such as months, years, or centuries can be useful as indicators of relationship between diverse cultures and dynasties, but tend to mislead in regard to political, artistic or intellectual developments.  Internal markers, such as the reign of monarchs, the punctuated occurrence of wars or economic crises, offer some more relevant ways to measure endurance of trends and experience of phenomena, but do not allow flexibility in regard to family histories, aesthetic fashions or architectural design or city-planning schemes.  Larger patterns of developmental waves, as for instance, child-rearing and folk-customs, may interact with one another and with shorter-term periods of social change, meteorological events, and technological improvements, but do not necessarily react in predictable ways.  Similarly, the apparent prevalence of certain physical or mental illnesses at one time or place rather than others does not seem to square with economic stages of history or supposed corrections in the status of debility under the law; name changes cannot be trusted to prove shifts in social attitudes or individual experience of discomfort or curtailment of mobility and emotional freedom.  The mere passage of time, along with external appearance of dress, decorations, and deportment does not sweep along in its flow all other aspects of existence, and certainly not in a uniform or proportionate manner. 
The great river of time, gushing up out of the secret depths of unfathomable darkness, [1]however we imagine it to begin, does not run smoothly in one direction: there are counter-currents, swirling eddies, under-flows, and the waters are filled with visible and invisible hazards.  Moreover, not only do the banks close in here and widen there, but the bed of the river changes from sand to rock, from smooth to rough, while smaller and larger streams run into it, hidden channels feed in or drain off portions of the current, and wind, rain and other external forces modify its flow.[ii]
Time too may be conceived a mass of atomic particles, exploding from a never-ending sequence of ordinary moments, expanding through a space it keeps creating from its own inner-energies, condensing and collapsing into itself as new mass turns back to the centre: and every particle or atom is a seed or crystal ready to grow out of itself, the residue of accumulating dust, the formless nebulae of gases, the labyrinthine swirls of electrical emissions, the pulsating chaos of fragments of sound and light, weight and mass. 
Therefore the history of mentalities cannot simply be built on the paradigms set out by political, economic, or art historians, although these paradigms cannot be neglected either.  Unlike those social sciences which seek to abstract general principles and formulate testable specimens of human behaviour or thought, the history of mentalities seeks to engage with the specificity of unique and unrepeatable events and transitional moments.  It is not that the matrix of human affairs is like a Heraclitean river never to be stepped into twice with the same effect; rather than no two persons, actions, or responses are constituted in the same way.  Time in its diverse forms runs along at different speeds, eddies about certain kinds of experiences, and swirls back with particular individuals or small groups before returning to the main stream.  Indeed, there are occasions when some event or persons seem to leap forward and begin to experience or even  articulate those aspects of the developing culture long before anyone else is aware or capable of making the break with the past and reacting consciously to the conditions elsewhere only incipiently present.[iii] 

A Dream-Like Instance
A few years ago, a tsunami swept from an island off the coast of Indonesia all around the Indian Ocean and beyond into the Pacific, wreaking havoc and costing hundreds of thousands of lives, and disrupting the ordinary existence of millions of people.  Given modern communications and its concomitant sense of global concern, or even responsibility, international aid-workers and supplies poured in to the effected areas, so that probably much greater loss of life and disruption was prevented.  A hundred years ago, however, such a traumatic experience would have taken much longer to become known and any sense of world-wide responsibility to develop, if at all.[2]  A millennia ago or more, and it may be that news would have been lost altogether long before it travelled outside the devastated regions themselves: the cumulative loss of life would have been beyond counting, the disruptions to commerce and public life deeper and more lasting, and in some cases virtually total. 
Human structures would have been completely swept away, arable lands saturated by salt water, and the few confused, dazed survivors scattered, causing virtually irremediable ruptures in social and intellectual continuity.  In other words, traditions would have been lost, or at least so radically fragmented and distorted, that historical memories of existence in the devastated areas would continue at best as vague legends, myths and nightmares.  The disappearance of whole cadres of professional specialists and skilled workers would mean profound forgetting of many fields of knowledge and craftsmanship, with the failure of family members or clans to pass on basic information and trade secrets.  Consequently, instead of smooth evolution or development of culture, there would be regions and periods of regression, blankness and unexpected new directions of art, craft, legal and political traditions.
Recollections of the original trauma, mixed with archaic residue of previous disasters, along with private nightmares of ontological anxiety and pain, would be all that could be passed on, somehow coded into a few objects rescued from the deluge or imagined and extrapolated from other people’s memories.  Anticipatory fears and intense hopes of avoidance and special privilege would also drive the creation of acceptable narratives of what had happened.  Meanwhile, to repress awareness of gaps in knowledge and loss of skills, rationalized versions of the origin of new and adopted replacements would be generated.  The suddenness of the disaster—which may have been all over in a matter of minutes, leaving instead apocalyptic images of a world destroyed—could be reduced even further in memory because, the real loss, the rupture from the whole collective past of the society that has disappeared, would be almost too much to bear: it therefore has to be effaced altogether, as though it never existed, or be displaced to another time or space, still there, still waiting to manifest itself in a better way.  Time is inverted, the past becoming the future, and the unfamiliar present made the mythical grounds for belief in the changeless and endless world of pure spiritual reality.  The trauma exists only as hallucination, and hallucination is institutionalized to assurance of a more real, permanent and moral dimension to life.

Peculiarities of the Space-Time Continuum
At one point in the Jerusalem Talmud, as the rabbis argue over how to judge cases where a girl of three years old has been sexually interfered with, the old adage that a girl of under that age cannot be physically deflowered but one over that age can be considered to have lost her virginity, they pose themselves the question of what happens if the child’s birthday occurs in Adar, a leap-month in the Hebrew calendar.  They decide, since Adar is repeated in certain years, they will push her birthday forward, so that she will have been under the three-year limit.  According to Zvi Alexander Fleisher, “The moment the court announces the additional month, her virginity physically returns.”[iv] The ruling is found several times in the Talmud Yerushalmi, Ktubot, 2:1, Nedorim 6:8 and Tihilim 57:3.  Moreover, Fleisher adds, “if her third birthday was the first day of the month, and she lost her virginity on that day and then the court announced that that day would be changed to then 30th of the previous month, her virginity would physically return.”  Putting aside social, ethical and legal issues in regard to how and why the little girl was violated, Fleisher argues that this is an example of the rabbis thinking and acting not just differently but defiantly in the face of hegemonic Hellenistic philosophies.  Whereas the Greeks in general allowed and were even themselves curious as to the intellectual ideas in ancient Jewish culture, they could not accept the idea that “studying the Torah is a guiding light for sanctifying the physical.  “The Greeks could not accept his concept of the power of the Torah mastering over the physical and therefore attempted to abolish the court announcing the new moon or adding an additional month to then lunar calendar” (Fleisher). 
            Nor could we, I suppose, if it were a matter of taking this whole rabbinical discussion in a literal sense: as though time (when the child was raped) and space (the intactness of her hymen) were subject to ethical will or intellectual necessity.  But, of course, as historians of mentalities we are interested in seeing how different people at different times and in different places imagined they could bend, reverse, and repeat time and also condense, expand and fissure space into new kinds of patterns. 
            A few months ago (in May 2006) news broke into the popular press about a finding that puts the relationship between languages, the workings of the brain, and the cultural conceptions of time and space into question.[3]  A proverbially small and isolated tribe in the Amazon, composed of perhaps only 350 people, is said to conceive of the past and the future in a strikingly bizarre way: for the Piraha of Brazil, the past is seen in front of them before their eyes and so as something clearly seen, whereas the future is a hidden dimension of speculative reality coming up behind them, and they point to it back over their shoulders when they speak.[v]  More than this perhaps only figure of speech and quirk of gesturing to supplement such verbal structures, some claim that the Piraha cannot conceive of numbers beyond one and a few, and even find it difficult to accept that anyone or anything exists when it is not right in front of their eyes.   Time therefore makes sense only when it is the existential moment, and, although it may linger briefly as a residue of images once perceived, it cannot be extrapolated into that which is not yet experienced, even as the probability of repetition or recurrence.  Similarly, space is contracted into the immediacy of the present view, allowing, however, for that phenomenon of the remembered present when the microsecond of delay between external sensation of sight and the mind’s internal anticipatory adjustment, correction and interpretation take place—hence the “past” that is seen in front of a speaker begins in the moment not yet completely registered and continues back into recharged previous experiences that normalize the prior moments into a relatively trustworthy matrix of judgment and emotional fit; but there is no space yet conceivable in which the future can flow in, take shape, and gain recognition, except in a most unsteady and unsettling way.  The future sneaks up on the speaker and her audience.  Without clues as to what persons, ideas, or events it may continue or re-introduce, its sudden appearance is a shock.  And yet it is not as though the Piraha existed in a perpetual epistemological crisis where nothing new can be known, recollected and used to expand the field of knowledge.  Everett argues that “These people know the names of every species in the jungle.  They know the behaviour of all the animals.  They know their environment better than any American [i.e., North American, educated bourgeois citizen] knows his [and presumably hers].”  Yet this may be precisely the sticking point: theirs is an existential not a speculative or imaginative knowledge, vast and timeless rather than critically focussed and attuned to changes in the environment and in their own cumulative experiences. 
Where the antique rabbis could playfully claim to control both time and spade on the basis of intellectual and ethical authority but always recognizing the harsh and brutal realities of the world they lived in—and were forced to live in by historical circumstances beyond their control—the Amazonian Piraha, until recently, at least, when their young men and women began to engage far more with the Portuguese-speaking and hegemonic society impinging on their traditional ways, seem to filter out the frightening concepts of extension or infinite otherness, on the one hand, and the inevitable and ineluctable formation of the future out of the realities of the present and the past. 
Given these ways of textualizing time and space, the historian of mentalities should be prepared to recognize many others as well, whether Greek, Indian, Chinese, Polynesian  or whatever, and neither think that he/she can either transform them at will into a single natural or logical system or censor out unwanted perceptions, conceptions and contradictions.[vi]









[i] Texts and anti-texts are competing versions of a narrative or argument, and so they may be merged, compromised, and accepted as mystically co-existent.  Anti-texts and un-texts have more intense and problematical relationships: the anti-text denies reality to the text and seeks to eradicate it, giving no quarter, no room for compromise, no logical grounds for accommodation; while the un-texts exceed that aggressive, fundamentalist impulse to eradicate all opposition because they devour themselves, deny space and time for textualization at all, and draw all memories and speculations down into a great black hole of destruction.
[ii] I resist the temptation here to double over this metaphoric figure by imagining time as a volcanic flow of lava, spreading into many fiery rivers and burning its way towards the ocean; or even charging out of some undersea source and flowing in streams of fire out towards the edges of islands and continents.
[iii] One thinks of the weeks and months it took for the rest of Europe to learn of the great Lisbon Earthquake in the mid-eighteenth century, or that in Petosi, Peru., and how most of the world never heard of the great floods and earthquakes that killed millions in China.
[iv] Zvi Alexander Fleisher, “Sedrah Selections Va’Yeishev 5761 BS”D: L’iluy Nishmas Ovi Mori R’Chaim B”R Simchoh z’l hk”m” Shema Yisroel Torah Network online at http://www.shemayisrael.co.il/parsha/fleisher/archives/ vayeishev61.
[v] Elizabeth Davies, “Amazon Discovery Challenges Theory of Language”, The New Zealand Herald (30 May 2006), an article taken from the Independent in the UK, and based on many published reports going back a decade or more and on arguments among Dan Everett, Peter Gordon and other linguists and anthropologists.  For instance, see Inga Kiderra, “Backs to the Future: Aymara Language and Gesture Point to Mirror-Image View of Time, University of California at San Diego News (12 June 2006) online at http://ucsdnews.ucsd.edu/newsrel/soc/ backfuture06.asp.
[vi] This essay was written upon request and duly posted in, accepted, but then, so far as I know, was never actually published.  It is retrieved and preserved here virtually as it was written more than six years ago.

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